Intra-Asian foreign direct investment (FDI) is dominated by flows from high technology economies to medium technology economies, while FDI elsewhere primarily consists of flows among high technology economies. This distinctive pattern is not due simply to differences in the relative distribution of Asian FDI recipients by technology, or to systematic differences in Asia's technology characteristics. A gravity model analysis is used to explore whether Asian FDI patterns differ significantly from those elsewhere, and if so, in what ways. The results show that Asian FDI flows, in contrast to other FDI flows, systematically favor hosts with relatively low technology achievement and relatively strong intellectual property rights regimes. This type of "Asian exceptionalism" is consistent with "flying geese" theories that have argued that Asian development is the result of technology flows among economies that occupy nearby rungs of the technology ladder. This paper finds that Asian FDI flows differ significantly from those in other regions in ways that make them especially conducive to technology transfers. Asian FDI is dominated by flows from relatively high technology economies to relatively low technology economies, while the rest of the world's FDI connects mostly similar, high technology economies. This "Asian exceptionalism" turns out to reflect not only differences in the relative emphasis on vertical and horizontal FDI, but also differences in the determinants of FDI. Technology-related aspects of the environment have different and greater effects on FDI in Asia than elsewhere. Specifically, large technological gaps and strong property rights help to drive investment in Asia, but are much less significant for investment elsewhere.
Technological upgrading has played a central role in East Asian development, second only to the region's export orientation. Most of East Asia's miracle economies started low on the global technology ladder but moved up fast to become producers and exporters of technologically sophisticated products. They acquired technology by many means, ranging from legal and sometimes illegal imitation of foreign technology to formal channels such as licensing and direct investment. The region's early stars (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) typically relied on reverse engineering and occasional licensing, while late developers (Southeast Asia, China, and most recently India, especially in its service sectors) emphasized technology imports through foreign investment. Late developers increasingly imported technology from the early stars, which have become significant sources of know-how and investment. This paper finds that Asian FDI flows differ significantly from those in other regions in ways that make them especially conducive to technology transfers. Asian FDI is dominated by flows from relatively high technology economies to relatively low technology economies, while the rest of the world's FDI connects mostly similar, high technology economies. This "Asian exceptionalism" turns out to reflect not only differences in the relative emphasis on vertical and horizontal FDI, but also differences in the determinants of FDI. Technology-related aspects of the environment have different and greater effects on FDI in Asia than elsewhere. Specifically, large technological gaps and strong property rights help to drive investment in Asia, but are much less significant for investment elsewhere.
The results of the paper provide support for the well-known "flying geese" model of technological development (Akamatsu 1962 , Kojima 2000 which argues that Asia's technological progress depends on interregional transfers of technology and related industrial development from more advanced economies to less advanced ones. They are also consistent with the finding that in some Asian economies significant spillovers are associated with FDI (for example in this issue by Du et al. 2010, and Xu and Sheng 2010) . In Asia, at least, both economy-wide and microeconomic evidence suggest that foreign direct investment leads to the diffusion of technological progress and is instrumental in connecting advanced economies to those following them.
This study uses bilateral FDI flows collected on a one-time basis by UNCTAD from balance of payments data.
2 Aside from this dataset, bilateral FDI analysis is usually based on OECD data for major source countries. Those data are not complete enough to support global FDI analysis as attempted in this paper; for example, the OECD dataset does not include most intra-Asian FDI flows, which we here find to be distinctive. To be sure, the balance of payments data, which are based on financial transactions, provide noisy and imperfect measures of direct investment flows. For this reason, the IMF has recently commissioned a survey to develop international data on bilateral FDI. In the meantime, UNCTAD's global dataset, despite challenges associated with its balance of payments definition, allows insights into differences in regional FDI patterns that are not possible with more limited datasets.
FDI and technology transfer
Most contemporary theoretical treatments of FDI are built on the "ownershiplocalization-internalization" (OLI) paradigm of Dunning (1977) as refined in the "knowledge-capital" models of Markusen (1995) and Carr et al. (2001) . In this theory, FDI requires three conditions to be satisfied. First, the source firm has to own some production-related asset-brands, technology, or management skills-that is a public good to activities inside the firm and to those licensed by it. Second, production facilities in the host country have to benefit from localization advantages, such as tariff preferences 2 The database can be accessed through the UNCTAD FDI portal: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1923&lang=1
(leading to the production of goods similar to those produced at home, or horizontal investment as in Brainard 1993 Brainard , 1997 or low-cost inputs (leading to production that exploits advantages and differs from production at home, or vertical investment, as for example in Markusen and Maskus 1999) . Third, the source firm has to find it advantageous to combine its assets with host production benefits internally through direct investment, rather than externally through licensing or contracts. Since most firms find it expensive to operate abroad, the decision to locate abroad must reflect a market failure that makes it necessary to link ownership and localization through internalization.
Since technology is often the critical source-firm asset, technology flows play an important role in empirical tests of the OLI paradigm. Technology flows occur with both horizontal and vertical FDI, but vertical FDI has a greater potential for transferring technology because it results in production facilities that are tailored to the production environment of the host economy. This paper attempts to unravel the factors that cause FDI to flow from advanced source countries to less-advanced host countries, that is, in ways that support technology transfer. Such flows are not dominant in most global FDI flows, but are dominant in East Asia. Since the goal is to identify the determinants of intra-Asian FDI flows, the paper is best seen as a contribution to the narrower literature on the technology-related determinants of FDI, as surveyed for example by Saggi (2002) .
The OLI paradigm points to two dimensions of technology as potential determinants of FDI. First, the technological gap between potential source and host countries is likely to affect the scope for FDI based on the ownership of technology assets. Second, the institutional framework for technology transfers-especially the strength of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime in the host country-is likely to affect the willingness of firms to use FDI as the channel to link assets to host production benefits.
Building on work by Krugman (1979) assets as long as possible after their domestic production advantage wears off. As a result, Asian FDI is more often driven by the conditions for technology transfer than by economies of scale or factor price differences, as is the case with Western flows.
As already noted, these arguments first appeared in the "flying geese" hypothesis.
Applications have shown, for example, that Korean export patterns followed Japanese patterns more closely than might have been expected on the basis of factor endowments, and that this pattern was facilitated by a broad effort to import Japanese technology (Petri 1988 ). Since Korea's strategy eschewed inward FDI, it relied heavily on technology transfers through reverse engineering and hiring Japanese technical consultants.
Interestingly, such patterns are now also beginning to emerge in Eastern Europe (Damjian and Rojek, 2007) .
The flying geese paradigm has varied implications, but suggests, among other things, that intra-Asian FDI will be more strongly driven by technology determinants than investment elsewhere. We test this hypothesis by examining the role of variables associated with the technology-transfer motivation, namely variables representing the source country and host country technological assets and the policies that affect the leakage of technology.
The technology hypotheses are examined in the framework of a gravity model of foreign direct investment flows. Global FDI flows over 2002-06 were approximately $3 trillion, of 1.3% of GDP on an annual basis, and rose gently within this period (Table 1) . Outflows accounted for a larger percentage of income in developed economies (1.8%) than in developing ones (0.3%), but rates of inflows were roughly similar. Asian economies were roughly in line with global averages, except for Japan, which has unusually low inflows and outflows.
Because Japan is Asia's largest economy, the region's inflows and outflows relative to income are somewhat below global averages. Overall, Asia received nearly 25% of world FDI inflows and was responsible for 13% of world outflows. Half of outflows were by newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) accounting for more than twice as high a share of their GDP as was the case for developed countries in general. These patterns are very different in Asia, as shown in Figure 2 . This figure is dominated by flows among economies at different levels of technological development, and specifically by flows from high-to medium-technology economies. More than 60% of this FDI involves flows from high-tech to medium-tech economies, involving both Japan and the NIEs as sources, and a wide range of lower-income economies as hosts. 
FIGURE 2. ASIAN FDI CONNECTS HIGH-TO LOWER-TECH ECONOMIES
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Finally, Asia's unusual FDI distribution could reflect differences in how FDI in Asia is determined, as compared to how it is determined in other parts of the world. Multivariate analysis will show, in fact, that is the most plausible explanation. Variables related to the technology transfer motivation play a more important role in Asia than elsewhere. For example, although host technology policy is not significant in a global setting, it is significant to Asian investors. Indeed, Asia's policies may have evolved to raise protection above corresponding technology achievement ranks in order to attract additional investment.
Exceptional drivers of Asian FDI
We now turn to analyzing Asian exceptionalism in the context of a gravity specification of bilateral FDI flows. Past studies consistently suggest that the principal determinants of FDI in such a framework are the size of the source and host economies and per-capita income levels, both on their own account and because they are correlated with other potentially important variables such as factor endowments. In addition, as in other applications of the model, bilateral FDI flows are expected to be related negatively to transport and communication barriers, including distance, language differences and so on.
We begin with a basic model of bilateral FDI as outlined in Equations (1-3). We then add science and technology-related variables. We next test the model's robustness to determine whether Asia is different, in two steps. First, dummy variables are introduced for FDI flows within Asia and within other regional economic groupings. This variable turns out to be significantly different from zero for Asia. Second, we show that the differences can be associated specifically with the operation of technological determinants.
The results are summarized in Table 3 , which reports the four different regression that implement this approach. The estimation method used across all four cases is the censored Tobit regression model. The estimation could be potentially subject to simultaneous equations bias, since FDI could affect independent variables such as GDP/capita, and even policy variables such as science and technology policy. This problem is avoided by using independent variables at the beginning of the period for which FDI is measured. (The strategy could not be applied to the science and technology rankings, which are only available for recent years; but the simultaneous impact of FDI on technology policy is unlikely to operate quickly enough to introduce a significant bias from reverse causation.)
The Tobit model estimates latent values for all observations, but assumes that these are realized only above a censoring limit. This amounts to assuming that the worst negative action investors can take on a bilateral link is to avoid investing. Specifically, the distance variable is negative and highly significant. Other variables that confirm the contribution of lower barriers to FDI flows include sharing a language, and efficient air and water connections. But some other indicators that are often significant in trade equations-geographic contiguity, good highway and railway links-do not provide explanatory power for FDI and are omitted in the rest of this analysis. These variables appear to be more associated with the ease of transporting goods than with bilateral links important to investors. The host's economic size, whether due to growth population or in income per capita, has a coefficient near unity, indicating that a one-percent increase in size is associated with a similar increase in FDI inflows. But the investor's size has greater effect-both investor's population and income have coefficients larger than one. In a multivariate context, then, explanations of FDI that focus on attracting investment into large economies (such as China) appear less important than other variables.
Dependent variable Statistics
Number 3.96 ( 8.3 ) ** 2.14 ( 0.9 ) Asian exceptionalism ln host STA * IA 2.97 ( 4.2 ) ** ln host Policy * IA -2.55 ( -3.7 ) ** ln source STA * IA 1.04 ( 1.5 ) ln source Policy * IA -1.09 ( -1.5 ) Tobit model with dependent variable censored at lower limit of -1. ** Significant at 1% level. * Significant at 5% level. Regional differences. With the fully specified model, we next explore the possibility of regional differences. A first pass is reflected in Equation 3, which incorporates dummy variables for bilateral flows that are within one of the world's major regional blocs: the European Union, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and "Integrating Asia." The connections within such blocs-which reflect official agreements as well as intensified market contactscould be expected to diminish barriers to FDI flows as well.
The "Integrating Asia" bloc differs from the others as it has not yet adopted region-wide trade and investment agreements. This group is defined to include 16 economiesChina, Japan, India, the East Asia NIEs, and ASEAN-that have already made significant progress in regional integration, so far principally through market forces (ADB 2008) . Within this region, only ASEAN has a comprehensive integration agreement. ASEAN has also made strides in recent years in expanding its "hub" through bilateral partnership agreements with China, Korea, Japan, India and Australia and New
Zealand. The ASEAN hub represents the core of a new bloc, but the agreements are new and relatively weak, and formal links among the region's economic giants (China, Japan and Korea) remain elusive. For all these reasons, one might expect the implications of membership in "Integrating Asia" to be less significant than membership in the other, more formal regional groupings.
In fact the opposite is the case. Asia, the technology policy of the host country turns out to be significant driver for inward FDI, while it's insignificant (and negatively signed) determinant of FDI among other countries. This is consistent with the view that Asian investments carry substantial know-how from the investing countries to hosts, and that the investor is concerned with ensuring that its intellectual property is protected abroad.
The finding that FDI has strong technological drivers and is sensitive to the technology policies of host countries provides additional motivation for FDI-friendly development strategies, such as those practiced by Asia's recent developers. While this study has not examined the spillovers that result from such inflows, in combination with evidence of such spillovers from other studies, the findings provide a rationale for active FDI policy.
Overall, the study supports the "flying geese" view of Asian development. Except for the region's early developers, the acquisition of technology has been facilitated by the Business and Horst (2007) 
